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Sherry Colb’s and Michael Dorf’s provocative and insightful
new book grew out of a pair of observations: (i) Many animal
rights activists are categorically opposed to killing animals (i.e.,
mammals, birds, fish, and shell fish) for food, sport, or science,
but favor the right to abortion, a practice that involves the
deliberate killing of a human organism. (ii) Many “Pro-Life”
advocates are categorically opposed to the destruction of even
a single-cell human zygote, but have no qualms about dining
on the bodies of fully developed, conscious sentient animals
“whose lives were filled with unspeakable suffering, ended
only by horrific deaths” (1). Is either of these stances tenable?
Or, are both groups guilty of a kind of moral blindness when it
comes to the moral status of certain individuals? With this as
its starting point, the book explores the various ways in which
the abortion debate and the animal rights debate interconnect
(and sometime diverge) and the ways these debates mutually
inform each other—an exploration that proves fruitful both
philosophically and practically. Anyone new to either debate
would benefit from reading this lively and provocative book.
The book is clearly written and engaging throughout and
would make an exceptionally useful supplemental text for any
contemporary moral issues course that includes sections on
abortion and animal ethics. Indeed, I plan on using it the next
time I teach contemporary moral issues.
When reviewing a book, it is important to evaluate it on its
own terms. Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights is not
aimed at professional scholars seasoned in the subtle nuances
both debates. It is aimed at laypersons of good faith, who are
relatively new to one or both debates. As such, the book does
not pretend to be the final word on either issue; rather, it is an
invitation and an opportunity to think seriously and critically
about both. By looking at these two debates side-by-side, Colb
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and Dorf “mean to provoke thought even if [they] do not
change minds” (2), though given the strength of some of their
arguments, I suspect some minds will be changed. The book
has two parts. Part 1 focuses on the ethical and legal issues
surrounding abortion and the instrumental use of animals in
agriculture and science. Part 2 focuses on strategies and tactics
that activists in each movement might employ to win over the
hearts and minds of those yet unconvinced. Rather than attempt
to catalog the content of the book chapter by chapter, my aim in
this review article is to engage critically with the book’s central
arguments and principal theses to highlight the richness of the
book. Let’s begin.

Part 1. The Ethics and Legality of Abortion and
Animal Use
The book addresses and answers two fundamental moral
questions:
Q1. “When, if ever, is it morally permissible for humans
to use or kill animals?” (11)
Q2. “Under what circumstances, if any, is abortion
morally permissible?” (11)
The book also explores the following legal/political question:
Q3. “To what extent should a democracy allocate
these matters to individual conscience rather than to
collective decision making through law?” (11)
Colb and Dorf answer these questions as follows:
A1. Killing animals for food and using them as experimental
subjects is almost always seriously morally wrong. As such, we
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should refuse to support such practices and embrace a vegan
lifestyle instead.
A2. Aborting pre-sentient fetuses raises no moral concerns at
all. Aborting sentient fetuses harms those fetuses and is prima
facie wrong (i.e., wrong in the absence of overriding reasons
that justify inflicting that harm). Despite the presumptive
wrongness of aborting sentient fetuses, some such abortions
may still be permissible, provided the woman has morally
weighty enough reasons to justify the harm imposed on the
fetus.
A3. Even when abortions are immoral, they should still
be legal. Similarly, even though killing animals for food is
morally wrong, it should remain legal given the current context
in which we live.
So, how do they defend these claims? First, they argue that
sentience – the ability to suffer – is sufficient not only for moral
considerability but also for possessing moral rights, including
the right not to be harmed and the right not to be killed. As
they see it, sentient beings have interests and the corresponding
moral rights needed to protect those interests. The idea that
sentience is sufficient for moral considerability is relatively
uncontroversial in the philosophical literature on animal ethics.
The claim that sentience is sufficient for possessing moral rights
is more contentious. Indeed, many people insist that in order
to have moral rights, a being must be rational. But, as I have
argued elsewhere (2016b), such a view is implausible for at least
two reasons: First, many humans, e.g., infants, young children,
and the mentally infirm, lack rationality, but these humans still
possess the right not to be harmed. Second, when identifying
a rights-conferring property, “the property picked must have
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some plausible rationale. There must be some reason for
thinking that possessing the property in question is necessary
and sufficient for possessing [the right in question]” (Engel
2016b, 46). Since the non-rational humans mentioned above
have a right not to be harmed, being rational is not necessary
for possessing the right not to be harmed. Rationality also is
not sufficient for possessing the right not to be harmed, a point
that, to my knowledge, has been totally overlooked. To see that
the argument: “X is rational; therefore, X has a right not to be
harmed” is a non sequitur, we need only imagine a rational
being without the capacity to be harmed (perhaps, God is such
a being). No being that lacks the capacity to be harmed has
the right not to be harmed. In light of these observations, it is
much more plausible to think that the right not to be harmed is
rooted in the capacity to be harmed. So, here, I side with Colb
and Dorf. If moral rights exist, then the right not to be harmed
is grounded in the capacity to be harmed. Since sentient beings
are harmed when they are caused to suffer, sentient beings
have a right not to be harmed. More controversial still is their
claim that sentience can ground the right not to be killed. But,
here again, I side with Colb and Dorf. It is plausible to think
that sentient beings with a life worth living are harmed by
premature death, and if so, then the sentience-based right not
to be harmed entails the right not to be killed.
Though Colb and Dorf don’t say so explicitly, it seems clear
that they don’t take these rights to be absolutely inviolable
rights; rather they treat them as prime facie rights – rights
that morally constrain us unless there are sufficiently weighty
countervailing considerations that override them. As they put
it: “Absent some very strong justification or excuse, we have a
[moral] duty to avoid intentionally inflicting suffering or death
on any sentient being, whether human or nonhuman” (13).

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 20, Issue 1

105
Mylan Engel Jr.

When it comes to raising and killing animals for food, there
are no such countervailing considerations. Since we can easily
meet all of our nutritional needs, and can actually meet them
better, with plant-based foods (45-48) and since we can easily
satisfy our desire for tasty food with delicious plant-based
meals (52-53), they conclude, there is no good reason to subject
animals to the horrors of factory farming nor is there a good
reason to kill animals for food. Since we all agree that it is
wrong to harm animals or cause them to suffer or kill them for
no good reason, our own beliefs commit us to the immorality
of raising and killing animals for food.1 Their argument for
ethical veganism is extremely compelling.
Since, on their view, sentient fetuses also have the right not
to be harmed and the right not to be killed, Colb and Dorf contend that aborting sentient fetuses is morally wrong unless the
pregnant woman has some very strong moral justification for
doing so. What about pre-sentient fetuses? As noted above,
Colb and Dorf argue that aborting pre-sentient fetuses raises
no moral concerns at all. They offer two independent reasons
for this conclusion. Let’s consider and assess each of these
reasons in turn. Their first reason for thinking that aborting
pre-sentient fetuses is morally benign is that pre-sentient fetuses cannot be harmed. Lacking consciousness, pre-sentient
fetuses are, in their view, “somethings, not someones” (44). A
pre-sentient fetus cannot be harmed, they argue, because, prior
to sentience, there is no someone to be harmed.
Is it really the case that pre-sentient fetuses cannot be
harmed? Colb and Dorf agree that grinding up live baby chicks
harms them, because it deprives them of a future life worth living. (111) But killing a normal healthy pre-sentient fetus likewise deprives that fetus of a future life worth living. If being
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deprived of a future life worth living harms chicks, it’s hard
to see why it doesn’t also harm a healthy pre-sentient fetus.
To prevent this discussion from devolving into a mere clash of
intuitions, let’s consider our commonsense understanding of
harm. To harm an entity is to make that entity worse off than it
otherwise would have been.
Harm: For any X, action A harms X if and only if
action A makes X worse off than X otherwise would
have been, had A not occurred.
It follows from Harm that not all deaths are harms. The death
of a terminally ill, incurable cancer patient wracked with pain
is not a harm. Every additional day such a person lives makes
her/him worse off. Death, in such cases, is a relief, a benefit.
We can use this general account of harm to explain when
death harms an animal:
Harmful Death: Death harms an animal to the extent
that it results in that animal’s life containing less net
well-being than it would otherwise have contained.
Aborting a normal healthy pre-sentient fetus that would
have had a life worth living results in that organism having
considerably less net well-being than it would have had if allowed to live.
Conversely, carrying to healthy normal pre-sentient
fetus to term would bestow a benefit2—that organism would
be better off than it would have been had it been aborted. Any
case where being born would confer a benefit is a case where
being aborted would constitute a harm. If being born would
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make the fetus better off, then being aborted would make the
fetus worse off.
Independent of such conceptual analysis, it’s worth noting
that most of us commonly think that pre-sentient fetuses can
be harmed. A pregnant woman who drinks excessive amounts
of alcohol every day of the first trimester of her pregnancy (and
then stops all alcohol consumption) harms her fetus by poisoning the fetus. When the baby is subsequently born with severe
fetal alcohol syndrome as a result of her first trimester drinking, it is clear that the pregnant woman harmed the fetus, and
it is also clear that the harm took place prior to fetal sentience.
It would be strange, indeed, to say that the harm did not take
place at the time of the drinking, but rather took place months
later after the fetus became sentient, since the damage to the
fetus was done at the time of the drinking.
The second reason Colb and Dorf offer for thinking that
aborting pre-sentient fetuses is morally benign rests on the distinction between negative and positive duties. Negative duties
are duties to do no harm. Positive duties are duties to provide
some benefit or affirmative assistance. Colb and Dorf draw
on the act/omission distinction to argue that we have a strong
negative duty to refrain from harming any being capable of
being harmed (it is clearly wrong to actively harm another being), but, they insist, we have no positive duties to assist others
(failing to confer a benefit is perfectly permissible)—unless we
acquire those positive duties by voluntarily entering into certain kinds of relationships or agreements. Since they think that
pre-sentient fetuses cannot be harmed (for reasons discussed
above), they contend that aborting such fetuses is just a failure
to provide the fetus the benefit of being born. Since they think
we have no positive duty to benefit others, they conclude that a

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 20, Issue 1

108
Mylan Engel Jr.

pregnant woman has no duty to benefit a pre-sentient fetus by
bringing that fetus to term. (110)
The supposed moral distinction between actions and
omissions does not hold up well to philosophical scrutiny. Consider Peter Singer’s famous pond example: On my way to give
a lecture, I notice that a small child has fallen into the campus
pond and is in danger of drowning. If I wade in and save the
child, I may ruin my shoes and pants, and I may have to delay
my lecture. “Would anyone deny that I ought to wade in and
pull the child out?” (Singer 2011, 199).
As I understand them, Colb and Dorf think that my wading
in to save the child would be an act of superegoration. Saving
the child, though an incredibly good thing to do, is not morally
required. Usually, it is only utilitarians that have to bite such
large bullets. My take on the pond example (and the take of
most others I’ve encountered) is that it would be profoundly
morally wrong of me to let the child drown, and if that’s right,
then we do have positive duties to assist others in addition to
negative duties to do them no harm. Moreover, my positive
duty to save the drowning child becomes even stronger, if I am
the only person who can do so.
If, as I argued above, pre-sentient fetuses can be harmed by
their deaths and if the capacity to be harmed in a certain way
confers a right not to be harmed in that way, then pre-sentient
fetuses, like their sentient counterparts, have a prima facie
right not to be killed. Even so, it wouldn’t follow that aborting them is always wrong because prima facie rights are overridable—the woman might have an overriding reason morally
weighty enough to justify the abortion. But it would follow that
aborting pre-sentient fetuses is wrong absent such a reason.
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Regardless whether or not pre-sentient fetuses have the
capacity to be harmed and the corresponding right not to be
harmed, sentient fetuses clearly do have this capacity and corresponding right. As noted above, Colb and Dorf hold that “Absent some very strong justification or excuse, we have a [moral]
duty to avoid intentionally inflicting suffering or death on any
sentient being, whether human or nonhuman” (13). Unfortunately, we are never told what sorts of reasons would be morally weighty enough to justify aborting a sentient fetus, but that
is precisely what we need to know to assess the moral status
of such abortions. Is the desire to not be pregnant a weighty
enough reason to justify killing a sentient being with a right
to life? Is the desire for a child of a different sex a sufficiently
weighty reason to terminate a sentient fetus? I suspect that
their answers would be “Yes” and “No,” respectively, because
they think that a “woman has the right to end the internal occupation of her body” (89), but don’t think that “she has the right
to discover whether her fetus is male or female” (89).
As noted at the outset, Colb and Dorf maintain that some
abortions are clearly immoral, but argue that the woman should
still have a legal right to have an abortion even when the abortion is immoral. They think the decision of whether or not to
have an abortion should always be left up to the mother. Given
current laws in the U.S., it is up to the pregnant woman whether
or not to have an abortion (at least within a certain timeframe),3
but it is not up to the woman whether or not the abortion is
morally permissible. Morality doesn’t vary from individual to
individual. So, it would have been very helpful (and particularly helpful for women wishing to do what is morally right) to
know when an abortion is immoral and when it is not. In short,
their discussion of the moral status of abortion would have
benefitted considerably from a more detailed discussion of the
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kinds of maternal considerations that do legitimately override
the fetus’s right not to be harmed and the kinds of maternal
considerations that don’t.
In places, they seem to suggest that wanting to not be in
reproductive servitude is a sufficiently good reason to kill the
fetus.4 They view any unwanted pregnancy “as an inherently
parasitic experience in which one being takes a tremendous
amount, in an intimate way, from the other” (66).5 Given the
parasitic nature of pregnancy, they argue that no woman should
ever be legally required to provide such reproductive service.
Consequently, they oppose anti-abortion laws on the grounds
that such good Samaritan laws would have the effect of forcing
women to remain in nonconsensual reproductive servitude.6 I
agree that there are compelling reasons not to enact such good
Samaritan laws, but let’s stay focused on the moral status of
aborting sentient fetuses.
Any reasonable person must agree that an unwanted pregnancy places a severe burden on a woman who desires to be
free of such reproductive servitude.7 The moral question we
need to address is this: Does the desire to free oneself of reproductive servitude provide a moral reason weighty enough
to justify killing a sentient fetus with a right not to be harmed?
Rather than trying to answer this question directly, it might be
useful to consider three less invasive forms of reproductiverelated servitude.
Case 1: Suppose a woman gives birth to a healthy child in an
environment where the only source of food for the child is her
own breast milk. If she doesn’t breastfeed the child, the child
will die. In such a situation, is the woman morally required
to breastfeed the child, or can she free herself from being in
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nutritional servitude by letting the one-day-old child starve to
death? It seems to me that it would be wrong for her to let the
child starve to death just to be free of the burden of having to
breastfeed the child. Compare Case 1 to Case 2: One could feed
the child, but only by purchasing store bought formula. Surely,
it would be wrong to let a child starve to death just to avoid the
expense of having to purchase baby formula. There are differences between the cases to be sure. Breastfeeding places extra
physical demands on a woman’s body and requires a kind of
intimacy not required by feeding a baby formula from a bottle,
but are these differences great enough to justify the mother in
letting the sentient baby starve to death in Case 1 but not in
Case 2?
Case 3: While it is true that only women can be subject to
the kind of reproductive servitude required by pregnancy, men
can be and routinely are legally conscripted into another kind
of reproductive-related servitude. The father of a single mother’s child is legally required pay child support for the first 18
years of that child’s life, whether he interacts with the child or
not. Suppose he simply doesn’t want to be in that kind of involuntary financial servitude for 18 years. Would it be morally
permissible for him to kill the one-day-old sentient infant to
free himself from such servitude? Surely not! If it is wrong for
a man to kill an unwanted sentient newborn child to avoid 18
years of involuntary financial servitude, but permissible for a
woman to kill an unwanted sentient fetus to avoid the remaining four months of reproductive servitude, there must be a morally relevant difference between these two kinds of servitude.
Note, I’m not claiming that no such difference exists; I’m just
asking those who claim that the desire to be free from reproductive servitude justifies killing a sentient fetus to identify
what that relevant difference is. Note also, I’m not denying that
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there can be reasons sufficiently weighty to justify aborting a
sentient fetus—threat to the life of the mother is clearly such
a reason. I’m just inquiring as to whether the desire to avoid
reproductive servitude is such a reason.

Part 2. Strategy, Tactics, and Methods
a. Welfarism vs. Abolitionism
Assuming, as Colb, Dorf, and I do, that the ultimate ethical goal is to bring an end to all animal exploitation in agriculture and science, should animal rights activists and animal
rights organizations (broadly construed) work, at least in part,
to improve the welfare of the billions of animals currently being exploited in the most grotesque, horrific ways, or should
they only support approaches that get the abolitionist seal of
approval, such as vegan education campaigns?
Colb and Dorf offer a largely a priori argument for favoring the abolitionist approach that I can’t rehearse here. While
I don’t have space to do this hotly contested intra-movement
debate justice here, I do want to stress that the issue is an empirical one. We need empirical research to determine the most
effective ways to eliminate animal exploitation, and that research simply hasn’t been done yet (though Animal Charity
Evaluators is currently in the process of identifying the animal
charities that are most effective at reducing the number of animals being exploited). Rather than offer my own unsupported
a priori speculations concerning this debate, let me make a
couple of ecumenical observations and suggestions. The first
thing to note about the debate over welfarism vs. abolitionism
is that the two approaches are neither mutually exclusive nor
exhaustive. Many organizations work to further both aims,
i.e., they work to improve animal welfare while also engaging

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 20, Issue 1

113
Mylan Engel Jr.

in abolitionist campaigns like vegan education and outreach.
There can also be hybrid approaches like abolition-aimed incrementalism. Critics of welfarism often cite the worst forms of
welfarism to make their abolitionist case. When a welfarist organization works with the animal agriculture industry to promote some inconsequential change and then, in turn, helps to
promote the sale of animal products so produced, that organization betrays the animals it has pledged to protect. But an abolition-aimed incrementalist organization can work with state
and federal legislatures (not the industry) to pass laws that ban
and criminalize all forms of unanesthetized mutilation. It can
work with legislatures to completely ban gestation crates and
battery cages. It can work to bring an end to government subsidies that artificially lower the cost of meat and animal products.
When such an organization achieves such goals, it should never
endorse the new “product” as “humane” because the industry
is inherently inhumane. Instead, that organization should immediately start working with the legislature to pass the next
reform. Each of the reforms I’m envisioning will raise the cost
of producing meat and animal products, and these higher prices
will reduce demand, which, in turn, will reduce the number of
animals being unjustly exploited. That’s not armchair philosophy. It’s simple economics.
b. Graphic Images
Should animal rights activists use graphic images in an effort to convince others to adopt vegan lifestyles? While Colb
and Dorf acknowledge that “exposing people to the violence
that they solicit with their choices as consumers is morally appropriate and perhaps even beneficial given our natural psychological processes for inhibiting violence” (161, emphasis
mine), they are nevertheless generally opposed to showing
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graphic images and videos of the violence inherent in raising
animals for food—on tactical grounds. Colb and Dorf worry
that forcing people to confront the violence they support with
their purchases can desensitize those people to animal suffering.
Is the use of graphic images and videos an effective way
to convince others to adopt vegan lifestyles? Or, does exposing people to graphic videos simply desensitize them to animal
suffering? Once again these are empirical questions. One piece
of relevant empirical data comes from the Farm Animal Rights
Movement [FARM]. Each year FARM conducts its “10 Billion Lives” tour to call attention to the 10 billion land animals
slaughtered annually in the U.S. alone. The tour bus travels to
college campuses and music festivals, and activists pay students and festival-goers $1.00 to watch their graphic four-minute 10 Billion Lives Video, which accurately depicts the brutal
treatment routinely inflicted on farmed animals. FARM then
follows up with these viewers via email. According to the 10
Billion Lives Tour website, 80% of the viewers of their video
commit to eating fewer animal products. If this self-reported
number is accurate, then exposing people to graphic images
and videos does seem to be an effective way of convincing
people to eat fewer animal products. That said, as an educator,
I’m more concerned about effective pedagogy in the classroom
than I am about “activist tactics” in the street.
There are a number of reasons why I think it important to
supplement philosophical articles and moral arguments with
graphic images and videos of the violence students are supporting when they consume meat and animal products. Such
images enrich student understanding of the degree of suffering inflicted on animals. As Kathie Jenni astutely observes:
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“We’re troubled by suffering that we learn of through prose
and statistics; but our unease remains vague, sporadic, and
practically inert. We respond in dramatically different ways to
suffering we see” (2005, 1). To morally respond to a problem,
one must believe that the problem is real. When students read
graphic descriptions of the cruelty and suffering inherent in
factory farming, they tend to dismiss the accounts as “activist
exaggerations.” They simply can’t believe that farmers would
actually treat their animals in the ways described. What would
normally count as a reason, i.e., an accurate written description
of animal treatment, loses its epistemic force in the presence of
the “exaggeration” defeater. Showing students graphic images
and undercover videos that demonstrate that the written descriptions they read are accurate serves to rebut the “exaggeration” defeater and restore the original reason. As Jenni puts it,
graphic visual presentations “make skepticism and avoidance
temporarily less possible. Presented with detailed images of
factory farms, the student who dismissed horror stories as activists’ exaggerations is forced to acknowledge the neglect and
brutality that she had heard of as real” (2005, 2). So, one reason
that judicious classroom use of graphic videos is important is
because of its epistemic value: “Seeing is believing.”
Graphic visual presentations also play an important role in
moral motivation. Nearly every semester that I teach contemporary moral issues, I have encounters of the following sort:
After reading and discussing Singer’s arguments for ethical
vegetarianism, some students will come up to me after class
and say, “Singer has convinced me. I agree that eating meat is
wrong.” Only to defiantly add, “But I’m going to continue eating meat anyway!”
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The next class period, these same students meet their meat
when I show a ten-minute Mercy for Animals video [“What
Cody Saw”] that documents the harsh realities of animal agriculture. After viewing this video, many of these same students
come up to me after class and say, “I had no idea it was so
bad. I’m never eating meat again. Thank you for showing that
video!” What changed? On day one, they merely believed that
eating meat was wrong. They had what I call “thin knowledge”
of wrongness of eating meat—a vague conviction that eating
meat is wrong, but they did not fully understand, appreciate,
or grasp that wrongness. They suffered from what Shelly Kagan (1989) calls “paleness of belief”: a condition in which their
beliefs were not fully absorbed, or did not fully register with
them. On day two, these students not only believed that eating
meat is wrong, they felt and fully appreciated that eating meat
is wrong. They acquired “thick knowledge”—a fully integrated understanding and emotional awareness of the wrongness
of eating meat.
I see it play out every semester: Graphic images and videos
serve as a corrective for “pale” belief. What was “pale” becomes “vivid.” Again, Jenni: “When we see that ‘inhumane
slaughter’ entails the struggles of exhausted pigs to escape
workers who kick them, beat them, and cut them apart while
they are conscious, abstract knowledge becomes richly informed and emotionally powerful awareness” (2005, 3-4). As a
philosophy professor, it is not my place to tell students what to
believe, but it is my responsibility to provide students with the
information needed to make their own fully informed moral
decisions, and I have repeatedly found that the judicious use
of graphic videos is an indispensible means of providing that
information.
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c. Violence
One of the greatest virtues of their book is that Colb and
Dorf never shy away from controversial topics. One such topic
is “Violence.” Should animal rights activists use violence to
help reduce the number of animal rights violations?
The first thing to note when answering this question, as
Colb and Dorf do note, is that we do think that some atrocities are so heinous that violence is justified to bring them to an
end. When the Nazis embarked on their genocidal project and
began implementing the so-called “final solution,” the Nazis
were systematically violating the rights of millions of innocent
Jews. Virtually everyone agrees that the Allies’ use of violence
against the Nazis to bring an end to the Nazis’ heinous, criminal treatment of innocent Jews was, indeed, warranted. Colb
and Dorf agree. They acknowledge that there are “times when
violence may not only be legitimate but may even be morally
obligatory. We regard the need to stop Hitler to have represented one such moral imperative” (168).
Some people in the animal rights movement view our current wholesale disregard for the rights of animals as the moral
equivalent of the Nazi Holocaust.8 Colb and Dorf maintain that
sentient beings have a right to life and a right not to be harmed.
Since animal agriculture systematically violates these rights,
Colb and Dorf explore whether it would be morally permissible to use violence to protect the rights of at least some of
these innocent victims. They “unequivocally and categorically
oppose violence” in both the animal rights movement and the
anti-abortion movement. (167) They offer compelling reasons
for opposing violence directed at abortion providers and for
opposing violence directed at the perpetrators of animal rights
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violations (i.e., farmers and slaughterhouse workers). First,
while it may be true that one can save some particular fetuses
or animals by an act of violence, there are other particular fetuses or animals that one can save without resorting to violence. When one can choose between a violent method and an
equally effective nonviolent method of reducing the number
of abortions or animal rights violations, there is clear reason
to prefer the nonviolent method. Second, they offer the consequentialist argument that in the current context violence is unlikely to be effective at reducing the number of abortions or the
number of animals victimized by the meat and animal products
industries, since other providers/producers will simply replace
any current providers/producers harmed by the violent attack.
Violence that holds no promise of achieving its stated end is
both immoral and counterproductive.9

Conclusion
As noted at the outset, Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal
Rights is a lively, engaging, and at times, probing and insightful introduction to the central issues in both debates. It would
be a particularly useful text for helping students to think more
clearly about the moral status of human fetuses and nonhuman
animals.
I should note in closing that none of the criticisms raised here
affect the soundness of their overarching argument. Regardless
whether we have positive duties or not, we clearly have a prima
facie duty not to harm beings capable of being harmed. Since
sentient fetuses and sentient animals can be harmed, we have a
corresponding duty not to harm them, absent a compelling reason for doing so. A pregnant woman might have a compelling
reason to abort a sentient fetus, but there is no compelling reason to kill (or pay others to kill) animals for food, since we can
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easily meet all of our nutritional needs with a delicious plantbased diet. Consequently, the book’s central thesis is correct:
The case for ethical veganism is much stronger than the case
against abortion (even where sentient fetuses are concerned).
Indeed, veganism is morally required when plant-based food
is available.10
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Endnotes
1 For a more detailed commonsense defense of the immorality
of eating animals, see my “The Commonsense Case for Ethical
Vegetarianism” Between the Species 19(1): 2-31.
2 A point acknowledged by Colb and Dorf: “for a woman to
gestate the pre-sentient fetus past the point of sentience and
then give birth to the resulting infant is, in an important sense,
to bestow a gift” (110).
3 According to the Center for Reproductive Rights’s “The
World’s Abortion Laws Map 2013 Update” Fact Sheet: “Currently, more than 60% of the world’s population lives in countries where induced abortion is permitted either for a wide
range of reasons or without restriction as to reason. In contrast,
26% of all people reside in countries where abortion is generally prohibited.”
4 I say, “kill the fetus,” because, according to Colb and Dorf,
most women who have abortions don’t just want to be free of
the reproductive servitude, they want the fetus dead. As Colb
and Dorf put it, most women who have abortions “do not want
the growing fetus inside them to exist anymore” (88).
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They compare an unhappily pregnant woman’s parasitic predicament to that of a man suffering from a tapeworm that his
body cannot defeat without intervention. (79)
5

6 A point first made by Judith Jarvis Thomson in “A Defense
of Abortion” (1971).
7 Colb and Dorf compare the burden women who are denied
the right to abortions face with the reproductive servitude in
which dairy cows and laying hens are held: “In each case, females’ reproductive capacities are used for the benefit of others: abortion prohibitions appropriate the bodies of women for
the benefit of fetuses; dairy and egg production appropriate the
bodies of cows and hens for the benefit of the people who will
eventually eat the dairy and egg products” (77). That the dairy
and egg industries depend for their existence on the unjust exploitation of females’ reproductive capacities was first noted
by Carol Adams (1990). She dubbed egg and dairy products
“feminized protein” to make visible the hidden female victims
of these oppressive industries. (1990, 80)

The protagonist in Jewish Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer’sThe Penitent poignantly makes the Nazi comparison as follows:
8

I had long since come to the conclusion that man’s treatment
of God’s creatures makes mockery of all his ideals and of the
whole alleged humanism. In order for this overstuffed individual to enjoy his ham, a living creature had to be raised, dragged
to its death, stabbed, tortured, scalded in hot water. The man
didn’t give a second’s thought to the fact that the pig was made
of the same stuff as he and that it had to pay with suffering and
death so that he could taste its flesh. I’ve thought more than once
that when it comes to animals, every man is a Nazi. (1983, 39)
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For others who have argued that our current wholesale disregard of the rights of animals is the moral equivalent of the Nazi
Holocaust, see Bernstein 2004 and Patterson 2002.
9

Peter Singer makes a similar observation in Singer 2011, 274.

An early version of this paper was presented in an “Authors
Meet Critics” celebration at Cornell University Law School.
I would like to thank Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf for comments on that version. Special thanks to Ramona Ilea for detailed written comments on the penultimate draft. The present
article is much improved as a result.
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